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ABSTRACT
Computer systems resources and all data contained in the system may need to be
protected against the increasing number of unauthorized access, manipulation and
malicious intrusions. This thesis is concerned with intrusion management systems and
specially with their investigation and recovery subsystems. The goals of these systems
are to investigate intrusion attempts and recover from intrusions as fast as possible. In
order to achieve these goals me should observe the fact that some of the intrusion
attempts will be eventually successful should be accepted and necessary precautions
should be taken.
After an intrusion has taken place, the focus should be on the assessment:
looking at what damage has occurred, how it happened, what changes can be made to
prevent such attacks in the future. In this thesis, requirements of investigation and
recovery process are determined and related guidelines developed. The similarities and
differences between these guidelines are explained.
vÖZ
Bilgisayar sistem kaynaklarõnõn ve sistemdeki tüm verilerin gittikçe artan
sayõdaki yetkisiz erişime, ve kötü niyetli sõzmalara karşõ korunmaya ihtiyacõ vardõr. Bu
tez çalõşmasõndada, Nüfuz Yönetim Sistemleri ve özel olarak onlarõn soruşturma ve
kurtarma alt-sistemleri dikkate alõnmõştõr. Bu alt-sistemlerin amacõ sõzma denemelerini
araştõrmak ve sistemi nüfuzdan olabildiğince çabuk bir şekilde kurtarmaktõr. Bu amaca
ulaşmak için bazõ nüfuz denemelerinin başarõlõ olacağõ kabulu yapõlõp, gerekli önlemler
alõnmalõdõr.
Nüfuz gerçekleştikten sonra; zararõn ne olduğuna, nüfuzun nasõl yapõldõğõna ve
yakõn gelecekte benzeri nüfuzlardan korunmak için ne gibi değişiklikler yapõlmasõ
gerektiğine bakõlarak, zararõn değerlendirilmesine odaklanõlmalõdõr. Bu tez
çalõşmasõnda, soruşturmanõn ihtiyaçlarõna ve sistemin eski durumuna getirilmesi
süreçleri ortaya konulmuş ve ilgili kõlavuzlar geliştirilmiştir. Ayrõca, kõlavuzlar
arasõndaki benzerlikler ve farklõlõklar açõklanmõştõr.
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Computer systems and the information they store are valuable resources that
need to be protected. An intrusion can be any irregular or adverse event that occurs on
any part of the organization and deals with violations of an organization's computer
usage policies. There are many different types of intrusions, which may include,
malicious code attacks, probes and network mapping, denial of service, espionage,
hoaxes and system and network intruders.
Simply detecting that an intrusion has occurred within a domain is only the first
step of the solution to the security incident problem. It should be followed by
determination of the focal point of the intrusion, and thorough analysis of all
information pertaining to the victim. Moreover, the attack should be stopped from
progressing, and it is necessary to assure that it will not happen again. Intrusion
investigation and intrusion recovery is an integral part of intrusion management
systems.
The main goal of intrusion management systems is to investigate intrusion
attempts. Such an investigation aim to identify the perpetrator of an attack, the
motivations of perpetrator and the means used in the attack. Moreover, investigation
should collect and preserve evidence in such a way that it should be admissible in
courts. Because of the nature of computers, collecting evidence and tracing perpetrators
are not easy. For successful investigation, appropriate measures should be taken
beforehand.
Another goal of intrusion management systems is to recover from intrusion
incidents as fast as possible. To achieve this goal, the fact that some of the intrusion
attempts will be eventually successful should be accepted and necessary precautions
should be taken. The problem with recovery is that the last stored state of the
information system may not be up-to-date and complete. In that case, a successful
restoration is not possible and some information may be lost, which may increase the
damage done by the intrusion. Therefore, the requirements of recovery process should
be determined very carefully. In this thesis, the proposed work addresses the
requirements of intrusion investigation, intrusion recovery and also implements
practical guidelines.
2Standards and guidelines specify technologies and methodologies to be used to
assist users, systems personnel, and others in effectively securing their systems.
Procedures normally assist in complying with applicable security policies, standards,
and guidelines. They are detailed steps to be followed by users, system operations
personnel, or others to accomplish a particular task and procedures established should
provide thorough guidelines on what to do if a security intrusion is discovered. In
addition, the procedures should compromise of roles and responsibilities, who to contact
and when to contact someone.
In this thesis, guidelines and procedures serve as a guide to Information System
Security Officer (ISSO) preparing proposed Intrusion Investigation Process and
Intrusion Recovery Process for the conduct and management of their systems. Also this
thesis explains a comparison of the requirements of investigation process with the
requirements of recovery process.
Guidelines of investigation process are examined, and the procedures used by
each are outlined. Intrusion recovery process is also examined, and procedures by each
are outlined. The result of these study aid requirements should be determined and
compared whether a correlation exists.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter provides
background on computer crime, computer security, risk assessment, security policy and
intrusion management. Chapter 3 examines the methodology of Intrusion Model and
Intrusion Management System Model. Chapter 4 and 5 discusses Intrusion Investigation
and Intrusion Recovery. Chapter 6 compares the investigation requirements with
recovery requirements. The final chapter presents conclusions and suggestions for
future work.
3Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
With increased requirements for interconnection in todays networks comes the
increased vulnerability to abuse and misuse of computer systems. Typically,
information protection architectures have focused on the management of access to
sensitive or critical information assets. This approach has often been in conflict with the
need to respond to breaches of access control. Most classical information protection
approaches emphasize the prevention and protection aspects of data security, excluding
the investigative requirements of responding to attempted and successful penetrations.
In this chapter, importance of computer security, risk assessment, security policy
is discussed and the intrusion management is reviewed.
2.1 Computer Security
In a generic sense, security is "freedom from risk or danger" [Kangasluoma,
2001]. In the context of computer science, security is the prevention or protection
against,
• access to information by unauthorized recipients,
• intentional but unauthorized destruction or alteration of that information
• denial of service [Oxford University Press, 1996].
Protection can be provided through any combination of various controls, such as
physical (e.g., cipher locks on doors), personnel (e.g., clearances), procedural (e.g., use
of passwords), or computer (e.g., file access control lists) mechanisms.
The objective of computer security is to improve protection of information and
information processing resources. A critical component of the computer security is the
risk assessment. The purpose of the risk assessment is to identify assets of the system,
threats that could affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the system,
system vulnerabilities to the threats, potential impacts from threat activity, protection
requirements to control the risk, and selection of cost effective security measures. Risk
assessment is examined in Section 2.3.
4For each asset, the basic goals of security are confidentiality, integrity and
availability.
Confidentiality ensures that there is no deliberate or accidental improper
disclosure of sensitive automated information [The Computer Security Handbook of
CIT, 2002]. This means that the information in a computer system is accessible only by
authorized parities. Authorized access includes printing, displaying, reading or
knowledge that information even exists. Many computer systems store information that
is highly sensitive, due to user privacy requirements (such as the secure storage of
personal communications in electronic mail) or organizational secrecy requirements
(such as private financial data or proprietary software). Threats to confidentiality allow
an attacker to gain access to this information illicitly.
Integrity ensures that stored data and data in transit are not modified
unintentionally or maliciously. In lay usage, information has integrity when it is timely,
accurate, complete, and consistent. However, computers are unable to provide or protect
all of these qualities. Therefore, in the computer security field, integrity is often
discussed more narrowly as having two facts data integrity and system integrity. "Data
integrity is a requirement that information and programs are changed only in a specified
and authorized manner [National Research Council, 1991]. System integrity is a
requirement that a system "performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free
from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system" [National
Research Council, 1991].
Availability is the property or process of ensuring that data held on a computer
system is always available to those users or processes that are authorized to access the
data. It thus involves protection against accidental loss or corruption of data (through
adequate backup, for example) on the one hand, and the prevention of deliberate acts of
sabotage, such as denial of service (DoS) attacks from the Internet.
2.2 Computer Security and Risk Assessment
Risk is the possibility of something-adverse happening. The purpose of the
security risk is to identify combinations of threat, vulnerability, and impact (called
risks) that deserve further attention. There are two elements of a risk analysis:
5• Identifying the assets,
• Identifying the threats.
2.2.1 Identifying the Assets
One step in a risk analysis is to identify all the things that need to be protected.
Some things are obvious like valuable proprietary information. Pfleeger [Rfc 1244]
suggests one list of categories; this list is adapted from that source:
1- Hardware: CPUs, boards, keyboards, terminals, workstations, personal
computers, printers, disk drives, communication lines, terminal servers, routers.
2- Software: source programs, object programs, utilities, diagnostic programs,
operating systems, communication programs.
3- Data: during execution, stored on-line, archived off-line, backups, audit logs,
databases, in transit over communication media.
4- People: users, administrators, and hardware maintainers.
5- Documentation: on programs, hardware, systems, and local administrative
procedures.
6- Supplies: paper, forms, ribbons, magnetic media.
2.2.2 Identifying the Threats
Once the assets requiring protection are identified, it is necessary to identify
threats to those assets. The threats can then be examined to determine what potential for
loss exists. The following are classic threats;
• Unauthorized access to resources and/or information.
• Unintended and/or unauthorized disclosure of information.
• Denial of service.
Management is concerned with many types of risk. Computer security risk
management addresses risks, which arise from an organization's use of information
technology. This section is organized by the three phases of an ongoing risk
management process: performing a risk assessment; addressing the mitigation of that
risk; and level of risk determination.
62.2.3 Risk Definition
Risks are the resultant value derived from the mapping of known and perceived
threats against known and perceived vulnerabilities. In qualifying the risks during the
risk analysis process, a decision is made about which threats and vulnerabilities need to
be controlled and managed. The application of security countermeasures should then be
selected and applied against these specifically defined risks [National Research Council,
1991].
2.2.4 Functions of Risk Management
Risk management is the process of assessing risk, taking steps to reduce risk to
an acceptable level and maintaining that level of risk [National Institute of Standards,
2001]. Each risk nominally goes through functions sequentially, but the activity occurs
continuously, concurrently (e.g., risk are tracked in parallel while new risks are
identified and analyzed), and iteratively ( e.g., the mitigation plan for one risk may yield
another risk) throughout the project life cycle [National Research Council,1999]. The
risk paradigm is shown in Figure 2.1. This figure shows the basic functions of managing
risks; identify, analyze, plan, track, control and communicate.
Figure 2.1 Risk Paradigm [National Research Council, 1991].
Identify, search for and locate risks before they become problems. Before risks can be
managed, they must be identified.
Analyze, transform risk data into decision-making information. Evaluate impact,
probability, and timeframe, classify risks, and prioritize risks.
7Plan, translate risk information into decisions and mitigating actions (both present and
future) and implement those actions.
Track, monitor risk indicators and mitigation actions, consists of monitoring the status
of risks and the actions taken to alleviate them.
Control, correct deviations from planned risk actions. Risk control is a part of project
management and relies on project management processes to control risk action plans,
correct for variations from plans, respond to triggering events, and improve risk
management processes.
Communicate, provide information and feedback internal and external to the project on
the risk activities, current risks, and emerging risks. Communication happens
throughout all the functions of risk management.
2.3 Risk Assessment Methodology
The output of risk management process is the residual risk and a determination
whether this is at an acceptable level or whether additional security controls should be
implemented to further reduce risk [National Research Council, 1991]. Risk is a
function of the likelihood of a security event. To determine likelihood, threats to the
system are analyzed in conjunction with the vulnerabilities present. This methodology is
represented in Figure 2.2, the individual components are described in sections 2.3.1
through 2.3.4.
2.3.1 System Characterization
Characterizing the system establishes the scope of the risk management effort
and provides information essential to defining the risk. In this step, boundaries of the
system are identified, along with the resources and information that constitute it. Assets
are classified as the following [National Research Council, 1991]:
• information infrastructure,
• hardware,
• data and information,
• system interfaces and connectivity,
• the processes performed by the system,
8• the functional requirements of the system,
• users of the system,
• all applicable system security policies,
• system security architecture,
• the operating environment of the system,
• the information storage requirements of the system,
Figure 2.2 Risk Assessment Methodology [National Research Council, 1991].
2.3.2 Threat Analysis
Threat is expressed as a function of the likelihood that a given threat-source will
successfully exploit a given vulnerability. Without a vulnerability that can be exercised,
a threat-source does not present a risk [National Research Council, 1991]. In
determining likelihood, one must consider vulnerabilities, threat-sources, and existing
controls, as described below.
2.3.2.1 Vulnerability Analysis
The goal in this step is to develop a list of the system flaws or weaknesses that
could be exercised by the potential threat-sources. This step systematically evaluates the
technical and non-technical weaknesses associated with the system [National Research
Threat analysis
Impact analysis
Likelihood of
exploitation
Impacts
Level of risk
determination
Residual
Risk
ProcessInput/Output
Legend:
System
Characterization
9Council, 1991]. This information is collected via site surveys, interviews with personnel
responsible for the system, network-scanning tools, and available system.
2.3.2.2 Threat - Source Identification
The goal in this step is to identify a threat-source, which is a human. A threat-
source is defined as any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to an
information system. Threat-source can either be intentional - a deliberate attack - or
unintentional. A deliberate attack can be a malicious attempt to gain unauthorized
access to an information system to compromise its integrity, availability, or
confidentiality [National Research Council, 1991].
In order for a human to be a valid threat-source, motivation and the resources to
carry out the attack must be present. Table 2.1 below presents an overview of the types
of attackers, what their motivations might be, and the means by which they might carry
out the attack.
Table 2.1 Human Threats.
Threat-source Motivation Means
Hacker, cracker
Ego
Challenge
Rebellion
System Intrusion
Unauthorized system
access
Criminal
Illegal Disclosure
Alteration
Monetary Gain
Crime/Intrusion
Fraudulent act
Terrorist
Blackmail
Exploitation
Destruction
System
Attack/intrusion
Foreign Interests
Classified Information
Other government interests
Intrusion/penetration
Insider (disgruntled,
negligent, or dishonest
employee)
Intelligence
Revenge
Ego
Monetary Gain
Intrusion, computer
abuse, unauthorized
system access
2.3.2.3 Control Analysis
During this step, the organization determines whether the security requirements
collected during system characterization are being met by existing or planned security
controls. Typically, the system security requirements are presented in matrix form
10
where an explanation can be included that describes how the systems design or
implementation does or does not satisfy the specific security control requirement.
Security controls for the system can be extrapolated from the following sources:
• Security policies and guidelines,
• System operating procedures,
• System security specifications
Technical controls are those safeguards incorporated in computer hardware,
software or firmware. Table 2.2 lists some of the technical controls used to mitigate
risk.
Table 2.2 Examples of Technical Controls [National Research Council, 1991].
Prevent Detect
! Access control mechanisms
! Antivirus software
! Identification & Authentication mechanisms
! Firewalls
! Encryption
! Audit trails
! Intrusion detection systems
Operational controls are those operational procedures and personnel and
physical security measures established to provide an acceptable level of protection for
computing resources. Table 2.3 lists some of the operational controls used to mitigate
risk.
Table 2.3: Examples of Operational Controls [National Research Council, 1991].
Prevent Detect
! Security awareness and training
! Disaster recovery, contingency, and
emergency plans
! Background investigations
! Security reviews and audits
Management controls are those security measures that focus on the
management of the system and the management of risk. By their nature they all fall into
the prevent category. They include security reviews and assessments, risk
assessments, and rules of behaviour.
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2.3.3 Impact Analysis
The next major step in the risk assessment process is to determine the mission impact
resulting from the threats (exercise of a vulnerability by a threat-source). The impact of
a security event can be described in terms of mission impacts attributed to loss or
degradation of the three-security goals confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
2.4 Security Policy
A security policy is a formal statement of the rules by which people who are
given access to an organization's technology, system and information assets [Weise
Joel, 2001]. The main purpose of a security policy is to inform users, staff and managers
of their obligatory requirements for protecting technology and information assets [Rfc
2196]. The policy should specify the mechanisms through which these requirements can
be met. Another purpose is to provide a baseline from which to acquire, configure and
audit computer systems and networks for compliance with the policy [Charles R.
Martin, 2001]. Therefore an attempt to use a set of security tools in the absence of at
least an implied security policy is meaningless.
A security policy needs to have the acceptance and support of all levels of
employees within the organization in order to be appropriate and effective. It is
especially important that corporate management fully support the security policy
process otherwise there is little chance.
Standards, guidelines, and procedures must complete policies. These must
ensure that all operations are consistent with the intent of the security policies. The
organization should undertake the definition of standards, guidelines, and procedures
only after the development of security policies. Within this policies, guidelines, and
procedures are established, appropriate parts of these procedures can be implemented in
intrusion investigation process and intrusion recovery process. And these relations are
described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
2.5 Intrusion Management
Intrusion is defined as attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity,
availability, or to bypass the security mechanisms of a computer or network [Shah,
2001]. The intent of intrusion may include denial of service, access to confidential data,
or compromise of existing data. While introducing the concept of intrusion detection in
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1980, Anderson defined an intrusion attempt or a threat to be the potential possibility
of a deliberate unauthorized attempt to
• access information,
• manipulate information, or render a system unreliable or unusable
[Anderson, 1980].
It is very important that the security mechanisms of a system are designed so as
to prevent unauthorized access to system resources and data. This field of research is
called intrusion detection.
The intrusion management concept comes down to a specific set of priorities
before and after an attack. After an attack has taken place, the focus should be on the
assessment: looking at what damage has occurred, whether or not prosecution is
merited, what changes can be made to prevent such attacks in the future.
The purpose of the Intrusion Management is to limit the possibility of a
successful intrusion through effective preventive, quality management and detective
process, and facilitating successful investigation of an intrusion or an intrusion attempt
should either occur [Stephenson, 1999]. Starting in late 1996, the Stephenson began the
process of developing a simple yet comprehensive information protection model. The
Intrusion Management model is based upon the assumption that the ultimate goal of the
information protection process must be three-fold. First, the process seeks to protect
information assets from compromise. Second, the process must recognize that
compromise is inevitable and that measures must be taken in advance to facilitate a
means for investigating the compromise and recovering, managing and protecting the
evidence of the compromise for future use in legal proceedings. Finally, the process
must provide feedback that can speed response to a compromise and generate
information that can be used to prevent similar compromises in the future [Stephenson,
1999]. Later in 2001 Tuglular improved this model as a policy-based management
[Tuglular, 2001] and investigation of intrusions is added as a new layer. This new
Intrusion Management Model is a four-step process, which is explained in Chapter 3;
the steps are prevention, detection, investigation and recovery.
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2.4.1 Prevention
Prevention is described as all of those underlying processes implemented to
create a secure environment and to avoid threats against information assets by using
policies, and standards. Those processes may be administrative, as in policies, standards
and practices, or they may be technological as in the application of access control tools.
The following steps should be taken in the intrusion avoidance layer:
• Analyze system configurations and vulnerabilities,
• Analyze, define, coordinate, implement and audit,
• Conduct virus detection, prevention, and elimination,
• Identify needs,
• Identify security holes,
• Perform risk analysis on all systems.
2.4.2 Detection
Intrusion detection refers to the process of identifying attempts to penetrate a
system and gain unauthorized access. If audit trails have been designed and
implemented to record appropriate information, they can assist in intrusion detection.
Although normally thought of as a real-time effort, intrusions can be detected in real
time, by examining audit records as they are created, or after the fact (e.g., by
examining audit records in a batch process). The goals are listed below;
• Monitoring and analyzing both user and system activities,
• Assessing system and file integrity,
• Ability to recognize patterns typical of attacks,
• Analysis of abnormal activity patterns,
• Conduct, coordinate and oversee network intrusion detection and analysis.
2.4.3 Investigation
Intrusion investigation involves determining whether or not an intrusion has
occurred, and if one has occurred, determining the nature of the intrusion, tracing and
abuses followed in a manner that facilitates appropriate responses. The following steps
should be taken in the investigation phase:
• Collect, analyse, and preserve evidence and related data,
• Determine whether or not an event is actually an intrusion
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• Determine scope of intrusion,
• Isolate the attack and determine how it was executed,
• Support legal investigations,
• Report all evidence to management,
• Tracking user policy violations,
• Understand the extent and source of an intrusion.
2.4.4 Recovery
This phase ensures that the system is returned to a fully operational status, and
also the intrusion and vulnerabilities that allow re-entry to the system are eliminated.
The following steps should be taken in the recovery phase:
• Asses damage and retore services,
• Document findings and make recommendations,
• Locate the most recent clean back up,
• Validate the system. Once the system has been restored, verify that the
operation was successful and the system is back to its normal condition.
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Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, two distinct states of intrusion management system are
described. The first state is comprised of proactive states driven by avoidance and
detection layers. This state is controlled by the attacker. The attacker controls the
intrusion time, and can take as much time or as little time as necessary to either cause or
effect all the steps in the intrusion. The second one is the reactive states controlled by
the defender with investigation and recovery layers in the intrusion management
system. The defender with any positive actions commencing only after an action by the
attacker has been detected. This means that, reactive states are implemented when the
proactive states for the attack has failed. This state helps to identify the damage that was
caused and the vulnerabilities that were exploited in the attack, determine why it took
place, repair the damage that was caused by it.
Both states work together to develop security policies and controls to minimize
attacks and the damage caused during them. In this section both the reactive and
proactive states are explained.
3.1 Assumptions for Thesis Work
The identification of the intrusion is the evaluation of the scope and impact of
the problem. It is important to correctly identify the boundaries of the intrusion in order
to effectively deal with it. In addition, the impact of an intrusion determines its priority
in allocating resources to deal with the event. Without an indication of the scope and
impact of the event, it is difficult to determine a correct response [Rfc 1244].
The attacker usually performs extensive surveillance on the system, frequently
mapping the network to find area to enter. Once the surveillance is completed, the
attacker attempts intrusions. The exact point of the attack is to
• determine and analyze all information pertaining to the victim,
• actually stop the attack from progressing,
• assure that it will not happen again.
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For the purposes of this thesis model, an intrusion management system capable
of detecting break-ins, penetrations, and other forms of computer abuse has been
proposed. The initial state of data is completely known at the beginning of the
computation, in computer system and intrusion is detected with damage. It has been
accepted that the priorities for sensitive data are changed according to these phenomena
assumptions could be categorised into three classes;
1. The first category in applying computer security is to establish the relevant
minimum standards required by policy for the system. Protective measures to meet
the required security standards can then be selected.
• the elements of the security policy that describe how intrusions are
handled,
• that the attack is serious enough, or complex enough, that standard
security procedures are unlikely to be sufficient ,
• the defender is usually in a reactive state,
• specific assets of the system are identified such as information, service,
programs.
2. The next step in applying computer security is to assess the threat levels for
confidentiality, integrity and availability for the system and detect intrusions with
some mechanisms.
• network intrusion detection systems or host intrusion detection systems
are available,
• monitoring the network to detect illegitimate traffic,
• monitoring individual computer systems for evidence of illegal access.
3. In this category assessment should seek to establish the potential damage of a
successful attack in order to provide a cost basis for justifying security measures.
• trusted data is available,
• back-ups run regularly,
• enable logging for system level,
• daily reviews of security logs,
• set up log archiving facility,
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• transaction logs,
• transaction auditing,
• implement file integrity.
3.2 Defender Timeline
In this section defender timeline shows the major parts of the reactive states.
After the attack has completed, the defender performs damage assessment to ascertain
where the damage occurred, how the attack happened. The defender then selects
optimum strategy to investigate and recover operation of the attacker. The main goal in
analysing and understanding the nature of the timelines is to drive portions of the
defender timeline closer with attacker timeline.
Before intrusion take the necessary steps to recover the system and sensitive
data against the known attacks.
1- Security policy and procedures must outline steps to take in the event of a
damage
• Identify backup points,
• Determine the required schedule of availability of system,
• Determine the schedule of database backup operations compatible
with the operating schedule and provide the required data protection.
2- Data priorities must be defined to save data than to save system software and
hardware.
Priority One: Protect classified and/or sensitive data. Prevent exploitation of
classified and/or sensitive systems, networks or sites. Inform affected classified
and/or sensitive systems, networks or sites about intrusion [Rfc 1244].
Priority Two: Protect other data, including proprietary, scientific, and managerial
and other data, because loss of data is costly. Prevent exploitation of other systems,
networks or sites and inform affected systems, networks or sites about successful
intrusion [Rfc 1244].
Priority Three: Prevent damage to systems (for example, loss or alteration of
system files, damage to disk drives, etc.). Damage to systems can result in costly
down time and recovery [Rfc 1244].
Priority Four: Minimize disruption of computing resources (including processes).
In many cases it is better to shut a system down or disconnect from a network than
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to risk damage to data or systems. Sites must evaluate the trade-off between shutting
down and disconnecting, and staying up [Rfc 1244].
3- Start by backing up the system
• To monitor all sensitive actions,
• Determine the real threats,
• Focus on theoretical threats ,
• Determine known vulnerabilites,
• Use intrusion detection systems to determine if the security
perimeters are being damaged.
After intrusion occurred and damage detected investigation and recovery
processes start. The defender performs damage assessment. Collect information for
better understanding of happened. Manage the volume of data, communications, and
processing in system.
In order to determine the cause of the damage it is necessary to understand what
resources the attack was aimed at and what vulnerabilities were exploited to gain access
or disrupt services. Review system logs, audit logs, and audit trails. These reviews often
help in discovering where the attack originated in the system and what other resources
were affected. It is very important that the damage be repaired as quickly as possible in
order to restore normal business operations and any data lost during the attack. The
organization's Intrusion Recovery Plans and procedures (discussed in Chapter 5) should
cover the restore strategy. The Intrusion Recovery Team should also be available to
handle the restore and recovery process and to provide guidance on the recovery
process.
Understand the extent and source of an intrusion. Implement strong reactive
strategies to detect and then correct any damage. The defender can then select optimum
strategy to recover operation of the system.
• Analyse and correlate logs from multiple source and determine what the
intruder did,
• Check file integrity, system to ensure that which files were changed in an
attack,
• Discover what weaknesses were exploited (for future prevention),
• Take steps to prevent further incursions,
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• There appears to be no damage to data, but evaluating systems must be
carefully to ensure no traces remain,
• If the attacker is actively damaging data, taking time to further establish
the pattern of activity is going to be harmful.
In addition defender gathers the attackers evidence. Intrusive evidence can be
found in files and other data areas created as a routine function of the computer's
operating system. Passwords, Internet activity, and temporary backup files are examples
of data that can often be recovered and examined. There are components of files that
may have evidentiary value including the date and time of creation, modification,
deletion, access, user name or identification, and file attributes. However, the loss or
compromise of data (especially classified or proprietary data) is usually not an
acceptable outcome.
3.3 Overview of Intrusion Management System Model
Intrusion Management System Model is independent of any particular system,
application environment, or type of intrusion, thereby providing a framework for a
general-purpose intrusion management system, which is shown in Figure 3.1. This
model has four main components and each one is described.
3.3.1 Avoidance & Prevention
Information security begins with avoidance and prevention. Intrusion prevention
utilizes authentication, encryption and firewall etc. to protect system from being
attacked and compromised. In this layer the important point is to determine what ISSO
needs to protect, and how to protect it.
General security goal is to
• Prevent intrusions,
• Try to reduce the number of possible intrusions,
• Detect quickly any intrusions that did occur.
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Figure 3.1 Intrusion Management Model.
Trying to reduce the number of intrusions would have to be accomplished by
providing secure mechanisms for end users to access their computer systems and then
educating those users and their system administrators about the proper usage of those
secure mechanisms. Some of them are shown in Figure mechanisms 3.2.
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Figure 3.2 Intrusion Model in Avoidance & Prevention Layer.
3.3.2 Detection
Policies and procedures allow to detect when, where and how an intrusion has
taken place. Additional hardware and software are required for intrusion detection.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) attempt to detect intrusion through analyzing
observed system or network activities. There are commercial packages used for
detection, some of them are shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 Intrusion Model in Detection Layer.
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3.3.3 Investigation
Policies and procedures are used to define how to react an intrusion, in order to
ensure that the intrusion does not happen again, and that the vulnerability used to gain
access to the system is eliminated. Tools and techniques, which are shown in Figure 3.4
for identifying perpetrators, tracing them back, and supporting prosecution need to be
developed.
Figure 3.4 Intrusion Model in Investigation Layer.
3.3.4 Recovery
Policies and procedures define how to recover the system after an attack. Recovery
and reconstitution techniques, both manual and automatic, are needed to determine what
damage has been caused and to which systems, how to limit further damage, and how to
bring systems back to a secure and usable state.
• Determine if intrusions are continuing and, if possible, determine the source of
the intrusion,
• Identify and close access points,
• Identify what has been accessed, destroyed or altered,
• Assist in recovering data from network backups,
• Recommend revisions to security facilities, policy and procedures,
• Implement revised computer technology security policy and procedures.
Policy
INVESTIGATION
Assurance
• Forensic Data
Preservation Tool
• Forensic Software
• Incident Data / Evidence
Collection Tool
• The Incident Response
Collection Report Tool
Guidelines
1- Apply computer
forensic techniques
2- Hypothesize the
attack
3- Reconstruct the
intrusion
4- Identify source
5- Correlate and
Preserve Evidence
Rules
Rules
Feedback
Data
Checks
23
Figure 3.5 Intrusion Model in Recovery Layer.
The remaining chapters of this thesis present a study that addresses to some of
the concerns facing intrusion response. In Chapter 4, intrusion investigation is
examined, investigation policy, guidelines and tools are summarized. In Chapter 5
similar study is made for intrusion recovery. In chapter 6 intrusion investigation and
recovery guidelines are compared with each other.
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Chapter 4
INTRUSION INVESTIGATION
Intrusion investigation and intrusion recovery are the integral part of intrusion
management, intrusion response and reactive strategy. If avoidance and detection layers
cannot reasonably prevent something, investigation layer wants to detect the problem as
early as possible and minimize the damage.
Once the analysis is complete, Information System Security Officer (ISSO) must
introduce some form of counter-measure to counter-act the effects of the attack and
restore the system to a safe state [Nikhil, 2000].
The overall goal of intrusion investigation is to answer the related questions of
what happened, how did it happen, what is suspected, what actions were taken,
who was contacted as a result and what evidence of the intruders activities was
located.
4.1 Goal
The goal of this section is to provide knowledge about the procedures to conduct
a computer intrusion investigation. It will also describe generic computer forensic
procedures, tools and techniques related to investigative process to ensure that ISSOs
and System Administrators are aware of the evidentiary requirements for preserving and
analysing computer evidence to support investigation and prosecution.
According to Rosenblatt [Stephenson, 1999], the investigation of a computer
intrusion has six goals,
1- To understand how the intruder is entering the system
2- To obtain the information you need to justify a trap and trace of the phone line the
intruder is using
3- To discover why the intruder has chosen the victims computer
4- To gather as much evidence of the intrusion as possible
5- To obtain information that may narrow your list of suspect or at list suspects, or at
least confirm that the intruder is not a current employee
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6- To document the damage to the victim caused by the victim in investigating the
incident and determining the amount of damage to its computer.
4.2 Scope
Investigation is used to determine the origin of the attack, and corrective action
should be taken as appropriate. The scope of the intrusion investigation process is to
determine cause and effects of an attack, and to identify, examine and preserve potential
electronic evidence. Electronic evidence refers to the entire range of information stored
in or generated by computers [Strydom, 2001].
Methods of gathering electronic evidence includes:
• imaging,
• specialised soft/hardware,
• utilising existing data,
• monitoring [Strydom, 2001].
Computer forensics involves the preservation, identification, extraction, and
documentation of computer evidence stored in the form of magnetically encoded
information (data) [Lunn, 2001], and the study of computer technology as it relates to
the law. The objective of the forensic process is to learn as much about the suspect
system as possible. This generally means analyzing the system by using a variety of
forensic tools and processes.
Computer forensic tools and techniques have become important resources that
are used in intrusion investigations. These techniques are described as;
1. On-line inspection
1.1 Clone the disk and copy: Copy the data to a remote host for later investigation.
1.2 Process Investigation
• view the running process environment,
• view process opening file,
• to trace a process system calls and signals.
26
1.3 Collect Network Information
• the host network connection,
• to list the open port,
• to trace a host,
• to trace the MAC.
2. Off-line inspection
• check the MAC time (modify, access and status changed time stamp),
• check the log files (syslog, messages, secure , mail, wtmp, utpmp,
lastlog.
3. Recovery and exam of removed files (not from back up tape)
• view the removed file name in the directory,
• calculate its inode position .
By using these technique computer forensic tools; 
• Protect the computer system during the forensic examination against
alteration, damage, data corruption and virus introduction,
• Find and record currently active files, deleted yet remaining files,
encrypted files, hidden files and password-protected files,
• Recover deleted files reveal the contents of hidden files, temporary and
swap files used by both the application programs and the operating
system also access the contents of password protected, encrypted files
and analyze all potentially relevant data found in special areas of a disk.
This includes unallocated space on a disk, 'slack' space in a file,
• Report an overall analysis of system, relevant files, discovered file data.
4.3 Roles & Responsibilities
This section outlines the roles and responsibilities of the individuals involved in
the intrusion investigation activities in the organization. Intrusion Investigation Team
must have a fundamental understanding of information systems. The team members
must possess skills and knowledge relevant to computer security. The members of the
team must understand how computers, operating systems, databases, and computer
networks function, and must have a basic understanding of the various concepts at work
in these areas (e.g., computer organization, distributed computing, database architecture
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and administration, network architecture and protocols, etc.). And they must also have
the imagination and deductive skills to solve cases. In the table at the below each
member is described with their roles and responsibilities.
Table 4.1 Roles and Responsibilities.
Role Scope Responsibilities
System Administrator
(Director)
To give answers directly to
top management
• Carry out incident response
activities
• Answer directly to top
management
Lead Investigator To give reports to the SystemAdministrator
• Prepare an intrusion report s
• Give briefing any findings
and/or determinations
• Interface with law enforcement
Forensic Technicians To carry out intrusion
response tasks at the direction
of the Lead Investigator
• Analyze that evidence
• Report on their findings
Evidence Handler To protect all evidence
gathered during the intrusion
• Receive any evidence that is
collected by Forensic
Technicians
• Check evidence into and out of
protective custody
Legal Adviser To provide guidance
consistent with all applicable
state and federal laws
• To provide guidance consistent
with all applicable state and
federal laws
ISSO To develop an Intrusion
handling capability within
their organizations
• Delegate responsibilities and
authority for implementing this
guideline, to include
designation of System
Managers.
• Review occurrence reports
• Ensure training programs
which are established for
system user
• Overall leadership and
decision-making during an
intrusion
System Users To work with work definitions • To run applications
Computer Incident
Response Team
To resolve all intrusions
• Identify computer security
incidents
• Receive intrusion reports from
system administrator, lead
investigator and legal adviser
• Log all reports
• Prepare a report of findings and
perform a post intrusion review
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4.4 Intrusion Investigation Process
The leading hindrance to a successful investigation is lack of complete, timely,
reliable information about the attack and attacker. The organizations Computer
Incident Response Team (CIRT) should undertake investigations of security intrusions,
whether they are successful or simply strong attempts. The CIRT should be trained and
prepared to initiate a formal investigation, present result to management, support
litigation or criminal prosecution if necessary, and ensure that fed back into the
Intrusion Management process [Stephenson, 1999].
An effective investigation process;
• identify causes,
• identify problem,
• recommend corrective action,
• provide information that can be used as a preventive tool,
• provide management with data about intrusions,
• provide information that can be used to investigate the need for
actions,
• all investigation must be documented and preventative controls put in
place.
This process begins with the intrusion investigation team members determining
the bounds of investigation in accordance with the organizations policy. All of the
necessary tools and functions are integrated into investigation process and allowing the
examiner to multitask, manage the evidence more effectively and build a case.
Investigation process steps are described as follows;
Step: 1 Review investigation policy and procedures
The first step is to assess the situation. What is the severity level of the
intrusion? Who will be involved in the investigation? Who is responsible for
determining future actions? The more such questions have been addressed in advance
by the adoption of a written security policy, the more quickly and accurately the effects
of the damage [Matuszak, 2001].
A- Locate the policy that addresses Intrusion Investigation Guideline.
• It should define roles and responsibilities; System Administrator, Lead
Investigator, Forensic Technicians, Evidence Handler, Legal Adviser
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• It should name a plan of action: Intrusion Investigation procedures
B- Locate the Intrusion Investigation Procedures
• It should state what to do, when, and by whom.
C- Evaluate the situation
• Is the intrusion urgent, what is the damage, is continued operation possible?
Step: 2 Collect information
Initial assessment consists of inventory of all potentially affected systems. An
important first step is determining if a perpetrator still has control of the any relevant
computer. If they are still logged on, an important decision is to decide whether to
terminate the user; leaving the intruder on the system may provide a better opportunity
of profiling and ultimately identifying and apprehending the attacker. If, on the other
hand, the investigator decides to lock the user out and disconnect the system from the
network, they can often limit the damage to what the malicious user has already
accomplished [Matuszak, 2001]. Record everything;
• Observations, Hypothesis, Ideas, Assumptions, Date and Time, Actions taken.
Step: 3 Take appropriate action
If it is clear that an intrusion has occurred, create an image backup of the
affected hard drives. An image backup will contain information that is not accessible
from file systems, such as deleted files. If an image backup is not feasible, check for
suspicious activity in audit trails and logs, network traces, any change dates on files and
directories, changes to startup files or the registry, new users or groups or members
added to groups.
After the initial assessment is complete, protect the system by physically
disconnecting from the network and shutting down the operation system to minimize
the effects of the attack and to allow for the examination of the system. Notify all
employees to change their passwords immediately. The following kinds of information
can greatly accelerate the investigation process:
• connection logs
• user authentication logs
• general system logs
• application audit logs
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• database audit logs
• file access/modification time-stamps [San Diego Supercomputer Center,
1997].
The steps of investigation process actions are detailed in the intrusion
investigation guidelines.
4.4.1 Intrusion Investigation Policy
One of the first steps by any concerned intrusion investigation process should be
to formulate a security policy that has approval from the highest levels of management.
Policies are later translated standards and guidelines and also into actions, directives and
consistent security behaviours. Intrusion investigation policy is explained below.
Intrusion Investigation Policy
Goal       : Collect, preserve and submit evidence of the intrusion.
Scope     : Intrusion.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Manager is responsible for proper execution of the following
guidelines.
Description of Life-Cycle: Develop hypotheses, Refine/Eliminate hypothesis, Determine the correct
hypothesis using the evidence.
Guidelines:
1 Apply computer forensic techniques
2 Hypothesize the attack
3 Reconstruct the intrusion
4 Identify source
5 Correlate and Preserve Evidence
4.4.2 Intrusion Investigation Guidelines
The aim of intrusion investigation guideline is to provide System Administrators
(sysadms) and ISSOs with a general knowledge of the procedures for conducting a
computer intrusion investigation. In a plain and approachable manner, this guideline
covers a generic method for the application of intrusion investigation. The main part of
the guideline addresses goals, scope, roles & responsibilities and describes process
issues fundamental to investigating computer investigation, and detail a procedure for
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doing search and information discovery of logical computer evidence. Investigation
process guidelines are explained below.
Intrusion Investigation Guidelines
No          : Intrusion Investigation Guideline - 1
Title        : Apply computer forensic techniques (Stephenson 1999)
Goal       : Determine if a security intrusion actually occurred.
Scope     : Victim Environment.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Collect background information, Collect evidence, Assess damage.
Procedures:
1.1 Describe the computer system including peripherals
1.2 Discover all files on the subject system
1.3 Recover all (or as much as possible) of discovered deleted files
1.4 Access (if possible and if legally appropriate) contents of protected or encrypted files
1.5 Analyze all relevant data found in special (and typically inaccessible) areas of a disk
1.6 Print out a listing of all possibly relevant files and discovered file data
1.7 Print out an overall analysis of the subject computer system
1.8 Track and document damage caused by the intrusion
No          : Intrusion Investigation Guideline - 2
Title        : Hypothesize the attack (Stephenson 1999)
Goal       : Figure out how the attack occurred.
Scope     : Access routes, logs, known exploits.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Construct various hypotheses.
Procedures:
2.1 Map all access routes into the victim computer
2.2 Analyze the attack theoretically
2.3 Test the hypothetical routes to the victim and users with access
2.4 Analyze logs
2.5 Evaluate known exploits in this system
2.6 Construct hypothesis
No          : Intrusion Investigation Guideline - 3
Title        : Reconstruct the crime (Casey and Seglem 2002)
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Goal       : Reconstruct the crime by performing the actions of the attacker.
Scope     : Hypotheses.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Follow the steps of the attacker, Compare results, Eliminate unmatching
hypothesis.
Procedures:
3.1 Create a timeline of events
3.2 Check the hypothesis
3.3 Refine/Eliminate the hypothesis
3.4 Examine alternative scenarios
No          : Intrusion Investigation Guideline - 4
Title        : Identify source (Casey and Seglem 2002)
Goal       : Examine victim and intermediate computers to identify the attacker.
Scope     : Files, logs, accounts, services, tools.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Find clues that indicates the source.
Procedures:
4.1 Examine critical files
4.2 Merge all logs and look for clues
4.3 Check for unauthorized accounts and unauthorized services
4.4 Examine communication connections
4.5 Look for changes to files, critical file deletions, unknown new files
4.6 Look for hacking tools
No          : Intrusion Investigation Guideline - 5
Title        : Correlate and Preserve Evidence (Romig 2002)
Goal       : Construct Evidence Relationships.
Scope     : Evidence.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Order the evidence, Find out missing evidence.
Procedures:
5.1 Find out functional and temporal correlations
5.2 Eliminate inappropriate evidence
5.3 Determine missing evidence
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5.4 Contact law enforcement immediately if decision is made to prosecute the attacker
Figure 4.1 shows common parts of intrusion investigation process steps and
investigation guidelines.
Step1 Step 2 Step 3
Review Policy and
Procedures
Collect Information Take Appropriate
Action
Investigaion Guideline
1
Apply Computer
Forensic Techniques
X X X
Investigaion Guideline
2
Hypothesis the Attack
X X
Investigaion Guideline
3
Reconstruct the Intrusion
X X
Investigaion Guideline
4
Identify Source
X X
Investigaion Guideline
5
Correct and Preserve
Evidence
X
Figure 4.1 Intrusion Investigation Process Steps and Guidelines.
4.4.3 Investigation Tools
Encase: Forensic software application that manages and enables viewing of all
evidence.
Primary Uses;
• Allows the examiner to perform all functions of the computer forensic
investigation process, from the initial previewing of a target drive, the
acquisition of the evidentiary images, the search and recovery of the data and the
final reporting of findings, all within the same application.
Program Features and Benefits:
• Provides user interface that enables examiners to easily manage large volumes
of computer evidence,
• Views all relevant files, including deleted files, file slack and unallocated data.
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Net Threat Analyzer: A tool that identifies past Internet activitiy.
Primary Uses:
• It can be used to quickly and covertly determine past Internet activities on a
subject computer,
• It can be used to quickly and automatically identify Internet web browsing
activities.
Program Features and Benefits:
• Automatically identifies and process the windows swap file,
• Can be operated from a single floppy diskette,
• Options allow for automatic E-mail pattern identifications,
• Options allow for automatic identification of file downloads made from the
Internet.
CRCCMD5: Software used to compare copies of files to ensure they are identical, it
compares the contents of the files and produces a hash. If the hash is the same, the
copies are identical
 Primary Uses:
• Used in computer investigations to prove that the evidence remains
unchagedafter forensic processing,
• Used to identify files that have been changed or have been altered,
• Quickly identifies altered files after a computer intrusion
Program Features and Benefits:
• Compact program size which easily fits on a floppy diskette with other forensic
software tools,
• Output can be routed to screen or a file using standard DOS comman.
Figure 4.2 provides stages for an Investigation Policy and shows a high level
stages involved in the guidelines.
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Investigation Policy
Investigation Guidelines Investigation Tools
Apply Computer Forensic Techniques Encase
Hypothesis the Attack None
Reconstruct the Intrusion None
Identify Source Net Threat Analyzer
Correlate and Preserve Evidence CRCMD5
Figure 4.2 Stages for an Information Discovery for Investigation.
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Chapter 5
INTRUSION RECOVERY
Much like any other part of intrusion response, and reactive strategy, recovery
from intrusion starts before computer systems have been attacked. After investigation
layer detects the intrusion, recovery layer wants to recover as quickly and efficiently as
possible.
Recovery is a systems ability to restore services after an intrusion has occurred.
Recovery strategies in use today include replication of critical information and services,
and incorporation of backup systems for hardware and software. These backup systems
include master copies of critical software in isolation from the network [CERT, 2001].
The overall goal of intrusion recovery is to answer the related questions of why
did it happen, was it handled promptly and properly and could it have been handled
better.
5.1 Goal
The goal of recovery is to return a system to its normal operational status
[Northcut, 1996], or ensure that the system and the data are exactly as they were before
the intrusion occurred and to restore normal operations as soon as possible [Gallagher,
1991]. Ensuring requires that the integrity of every file in the compromised system be
examined and restored. Recovery also contributes to a systems ability to maintain
essential services during intrusion.
After an intrusion has been detected and terminated, system administrators face
two difficult tasks: determining the damage caused by the intrusion and recovery of the
system to a safe state.
The recovery process allows users to assess what damage has been incurred, and
what information has been lost. Once the user can be assured that the attack has been
contained, it is helpful to conduct an analysis of the attack.
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5.2 Scope
Intrusion recovery refers to procedures necessary to ensure that intrusions don't
compromise a system's secure operation [CERT, 2001]. The actual recovery timeline
begins the moment a disruption occurs and continues until the business operation is
restored.
At this point satisfactory recovery strategy must be able to accomplish
restoration quickly, thereby minimize the effect on users during both backup and
recovery operations which is extremely important in developing an Intrusion Recovery
Plan (IRP) [Collie, 2001]. The intent of IRP is to provide a written and tested plan
directing the computer system recovery process in the event of an interruption in
continuous service resulting from unexpected damage [Janco Associates, Inc., 2001].
The IRP must be built to restore the applications and platforms that support these
critical functions in the timeframe specified by the computer systems units. An
intrusion recovery plan follows two important principle comprehensiveness and clear
action:
• it covers all the details of what is to be done in the event of an intrusion
• it leads ISSO to respond in the correct way
An important component to any intrusion recovery plan is inventory associated
• software packages, with version number
• date of purchase
• name, address and telephone number
• the purpose of the software
• the acquisition date of the software
• the original cost of the software the license number
• the version number [Collie, 2001].
5.3 Roles & Responsibilities
This section outlines the roles and responsibilities of the individuals involved in
the intrusion recovery activities in the organization. For this option, Intrusion Recovery
Team must have a fundamental understanding of information systems. The
comprehensive set of documented tasks are carried out during recovery operations.
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Table 5.1 Roles and Responsibilities.
Role Scope Responsibilities
System Administrator (Director) To give answers directly to
top management
• Carry out intrusion
response activities
• Answer directly to top
management
• Take all the responsibility
of implementing the
recovery plan
Planning Group
To manage the development
and implementation of the
intrusion recovery strategy
and plan
• Responsible for all
intrusion recovery
activities, planning,
• Provide regular monthly
reports to system
administrator
management
System Users To work with work
definitions
• Identify the list of critical
H/w and software to
reestablish the system
• Gather information about
the status of the files
when the intrusion occur
Security/Back-up Team
To retrieve back-up copies of
operating systems,
applications systems,
applications data and
ensuring security of the data
• Advise the System
• Administrator of the
status of back-up data,
software, of status and
progress
Damage Assessment Team
Leader(s)
To coordinate damage
assessment and recovery
activities for the system
• Develop, review and
update procedures for
damage reporting
• coordinate damage
assessment operations
• Identify and maintain a
list of critical data, service
• Collect and compile
incoming damage reports
5.4 Intrusion Recovery Process
The intrusion recovery process can recover the system that has been damaged by
the intrusion or malicious attack. Method of cleaning up a compromised system is to
reinstall the operating system and software allowing a faster return to normal operation.
Another approach is to compare each individual file and program against a copy known
to be original in order to determine if any modifications have been made. It is important
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to do a minimal level of analysis in order to determine the cause of the intrusion. Once a
cause is determined, changes to the environment should be made to avoid future attacks
by that method. This includes updating affected software access control methods that
allow only certain users, systems and networks to use the services, firewalls and
intrusion detection systems.
To follow those principles, it helps to have clear objectives for an intrusion
recovery process:
• create and ensure reliable back-up systems in the event of an intrusion,
• make simple, clear decisions during an intrusion,
• train operational personnel,
• train employees,
• respond as quickly as possible to an intrusion,
• test and ensure the continuous reliability of the plan,
• coordinate of restoration,
• reloading of software,
• schedule migration back to original site,
• coordinate return to original site .
This process begins with the intrusion recovery team members determining the
bounds of recovery in accordance with the organizations policy [CERT, 2001]. All of
the necessary tools and functions are integrated into recovery process, and allowing the
examiner to multitask, manage the backup more effectively and build a case. Recovery
process steps are described as follows;
Step 1: Review investigation policy and procedures
The first step is to assess the situation. What is the severity level of the
intrusion, who will be involved in the recovery, who is responsible for determining
future actions. The more such questions have been addressed in advance by the
adoption of a written security policy, the more quickly and accurately the effects of the
damage [Matuszak, 2001].
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A- Locate the policy that addresses Intrusion Recovery Guideline.
• It should define roles and responsibilities; System Administrator (Director),
Planning Group, ISSO, System Users, Security/Back-up Team, Damage
Assessment Team Leader(s)
• It should name a plan of action: Intrusion Recovery procedures
B- Locate the Intrusion Recovery Procedures
• It should state what to do, when, and by whom.
C- Evaluate the situation
• Is the intrusion urgent, what is the damage, is continued operation possible?
Step 2: Collect Information (Damage Assessment)
Initial assessment consists of inventory of all potentially affected systems. In the
intrusion recovery process the main thing is to assess the damage. The clear assessment
of damage, losses in the aftermath of an intrusion is a prerequisite for the effective
planning and implementation of recovery [San Diego Supercomputer Center, 1997].
Assessments need thorough planning, design and preparation of related data about
intrusion. For successful assessment;
• Data has to be timely, assessments should be carried out as soon as possible
after the intrusion,
• Data has to be continuously updated, in order to re-evaluate the needs and
the appropriateness of recovery actions [Planitz, 1999].
In this process the objectives of damage assessments are to determine:
• nature and extent of a intrusion,
• damage and threats,
• resource availability,
• immediate response requirements,
• estimates on value loss through damage.
Step 3: Take appropriate action
After the damage assessment is complete, minimize the effects of the attack. The
determination to return a system to normal operation is prior to fully resolving the
problem. Recovery techniques, both manual and automated, are also needed to
determine what damage has been caused and to what systems, how to limit further
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damage, and how to bring systems back to a secure and usable state. For this reason,
administrators;
A - Rollback: That is (restoring a system to its state before the attack) using the backup
files created before the intrusion occurred.
B- Reconfiguration: That is appropriate when one cannot roll back to a secure state,
possibly because backups have not been done recently or the system has been in an
insecure state since its inception.
• reinstall the operating system,
• perform an integrity check,
• restore the services.
The steps of recovery process actions are detailed in the intrusion recovery
guidelines.
5.4.1 Intrusion Recovery Policy
One of the initial steps by any concerned intrusion recovery process should be
restartable after intrusions and formulate a security policy that has approval from the
highest levels of management. Policies are later translated into standards and guidelines
and also into actions, directives and consistent security behaviours. Intrusion recovery
policy is explained below.
Intrusion Recovery Policy
Goal       : To establish a plan for restoration of information and operations following an intrusion, to
reduce the risk of disruption of operations or loss of information.
Scope     : Intrusion.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Manager is responsible for proper execution of the following
guidelines.
Description of Life-Cycle: Create system backup, make simple decisions, coordinate of restoration.
Guidelines:
1 Regularly Back up
2 Develop Possible Recovery Plan
3 Perform Damage Assessment
4 Apply Computer Forensic Techniques
5 Apply Recovery Procedures
6 Validate System
7 Reporting Intrusions
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5.4.2 Intrusion Recovery Guidelines
The purpose of this guideline is to help to understand the requirements for the
ISSO to be ready Intrusion Recovery Process. The guidelines for intrusion recovery
presented refers to the procedures and resources required implementing a recovery
operation. The main parts of the guideline address goals, scope, roles & responsibilities
and describe process issues fundamental to recovery operation. These guidelines are
explained below.
Intrusion Recovery Guidelines
No          : Intrusion Recovery Guideline - 1
Title        : Back up Regularly
Goal       : Minimize the effects of the loss of a data.
Scope     : Victim Environment.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Test, Verify and Approve.
Procedures:
1.1 Operating System, Applications, Database management system components
1.2 Database backup - User Data
1.3 Program backup - Program modules
1.4 Log file backup - Transaction Logs
1.5.Individual files backup - files in which Critical Tables are stored in
Intrusion Recovery Guidelines
No          : Intrusion Recovery Guideline - 2
Title        : Develop Possible Recovery Plan
Goal       : Determine the important and less-important data, processes, and services.
Scope     : Victim Environment.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Analyze system, Determine the priorities of the system.
Procedures:
2.1 Establish planning group
2.2 Perform risk assessment and audits
2.3 Establish priority organizations network and applications
2.4 Develop recovery strategy
2.5 Prepare an up to date inventory and documentation of the plan
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2.6 Develop verification criteria and procedures
2.7 Implement the plan
Intrusion Recovery Guidelines
No          : Intrusion Recovery Guideline - 3
Title        : Perform Damage Assessment
Goal       : Analyze the system.
Scope     : Victim Environment.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Analyze system, Determine impact of damage.
Procedures:
3.1 Identify extent of damage to the computer system
3.2 Determine condition of equipment
3.3 Identify software problems
3.4 Define data problems
3.5 Identify data communications problems
3.6 Define restoration requirements
3.7 Schedule and restoration
3.8 Monitor salvage and restoration operation
Intrusion Recovery Guidelines
No          : Intrusion Recovery Guideline - 4
Title        : Apply computer forensic techniques (Stephenson 1999)
Goal       : Determine if a security intrusion actually occurred.
Scope     : Victim Environment.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Collect background information, Collect evidence, Assess damage.
Procedures:
4.1 Discover all files on the subject system (normal files, deleted yet remaining files, hidden files,
password-protected files, and encrypted files)
4.2 Print out an overall analysis of the subject computer system
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Intrusion Recovery Guidelines
No          : Intrusion Recovery Guideline - 5
Title        : Apply Recovery Procedures
Goal       : Return the systems to normal.
Scope     : Victim Environment.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Watch the logs, Find the hole , Repair them.
Procedures:
5.1 Disconnect the local area network that an intruder is using
5.2 Disconnect the compromised system from the local network
5.3 Ensure all backup/recovery types are addressed in the Backup and Recovery Plan
5.4 Test out all backup and recovery procedures to ensure they meet desired objectives
5.5 Determine the requirements and timeframe for returning the system to normal operations
Intrusion Recovery Guidelines
No          : Intrusion Recovery Guideline - 6
Title        : Validate the system
Goal       : Where the system has been restored monitor the systems.
Scope     : Victim Environment.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Watch the logs, Maintain the integrity.
Procedures:
6.1 Verify that the operation is successful
6.2 Check the system is back to its normal condition
6.3 Update your security policy
6.4 Continue to monitor for back doors may be escaped detection
Intrusion Recovery Guidelines
No          : Intrusion Recovery Guideline - 7
Title        : Reporting Intrusions
Goal       : Document security violations.
Scope     : Victim Environment.
Roles & Responsibilities: Security Officer is responsible for proper execution of the following
procedures.
Description of Life-Cycle: Write a report.
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Procedures:
7.1 Review and analyze intrusion-tracking database
7.2 Share information on security violations with other system managers.
Figure 5.1 shows common parts of intrusion recovery process steps and recovery
guidelines.
Step1 Step 2 Step 3
Review Policy and
Procedures
Damage Assessment
(Collect Information)
Take Appropriate
Action
Recovery Guideline
1
Back up Regularly
X
Recovery Guideline
2
Develop Possible
Recovery Plan
X X
Recovery Guideline
3
Perform Damage
Assessment
X X X
Recovery Guideline
4
Apply Computer
Forensic Techniques
X X X
Recovery Guideline
5
Apply Recovery
Procedures
X
Recovery Guideline
6
Validate System
X
Recovery Guideline 7
Reporting Intrusion X
Figure 5.1 Intrusion Recovery Process Steps and Guidelines.
5.4.3 Recovery Tools
Many software tools have been developed to assist the ISSO during recovery
process. Below are just a few of the tools on the market today and their main functions
are shown;
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SafeBack used to covertly to duplicate all storage areas on a computer hard disk drive
Primary Uses:
• The program is used to archive the image hard disk drives on Intel based computer
systems.
• The program is also used to restore archived images on another computer hard disk
drive of equal or larger storage capacity.
Program Features and Benefits:
• Provides a detailed audit trail of the backup process for evidence documentation
purposes.
• Copies all areas of the hard disk drive
• Allows for the backup process to be made via the printer port.
• Fast and efficient. Depending on the hardware configurations involved, the data
transfer rate exceeds 50 million bytes per minute during the backup process.
• Copies and restores multiple partitions containing one or more operating systems.
• Can be used to accurately copy and restore Windows NT and Windows 2000 drives
in a raid configuration [New Technologies Inc.].
• CRCCMD5 this tool is described on page 34.
• Encase this tool is described on page 35.
Recovery Policy
Recovery Guidelines Recovery Tools
Back up Regularly SafeBack
Develop Possible Recovery Plan None
Perform Damage Assessment CRCCMD5
Apply Computer Recovery Procedures EnCase
Validate System None
Reporting Intrusions None
Figure 5.2: Stages for an Information Discovery for Recovery.
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Chapter 6
COMPARISON
This chapter provides a comparison of the guidelines which are used in the
investigation and recovery processes. The aim is to show similarities and differences in
guidelines between these two processes. These guidelines are used by ISSO for
managing their systems after intrusion occurred. ISSO needs to analysis and eliminate
an intruders access to system as soon as possible and recover the data and the system,
recognize that the system is vulnerable to another occurrence of the same type of
intrusion.
Guideline No-1 for Investigation Process and Guideline No-4 for Recovery
Process has the similarity which is computer forensic analysis. Before attempting to
collect evidence from a computer, it is important to have an understanding of how
forensic science is applied to computers. Computer forensic is a digital detective work.
Electronic data can include any record, file, source code, program, computer
manufacturer specifications, and other information on a computer storage device.
Forensic analysis comprised mainly digital evidence recovery, forensic data analysis
and document management services.
The "Identify - Preserve - Analyze - Report model serves to describe the overall
forensic process. Once a forensic technician identifies the systems containing data of an
evidentiary nature, then the team member must properly preserve their digital contents
in a forensically sound manner. After preserving the evidence, an investigator conducts
some series of examinations by analysing the data on the system to extract relevant
information from it. After identifying relevant information, the results of these efforts
are reported in predetermined format.
Data requirements and the level of detail of information vary at different times for
investigation and recovery processes. Therefore, different types of guidelines are
conducted for investigation and recovery processes. Data for investigation process has
to be thoroughly analysed and interpreted in order to become meaningful and useful
information for investigation team members.
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It is observed that Intrusion Investigation Guidelines other than No-1 possess no
similarities with the guidelines of intrusion recovery except No:4 Due to different
objectives of these processes, the remaining guidelines are different.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION and FURTHER WORK
Intrusion investigation and recovery from an intrusion are two goals of intrusion
management systems. Both processes usually consist of checking logs for unusual
activity, unusual connections, and alterations in the system files.
When an intrusion has been detected, the investigation team members need to
first regain the control of the compromised system. The system must then be
investigated thoroughly by reviewing audit files. System data should also be checked to
make sure the intruder has not changed them. This is a primary source of information on
how, when and where the intrusion occurred.
Once an intrusion has been investigated and reported, then follows the task of
recovery from the intrusion. First, the system should be backed up to allow the intrusion
to be analyzed later, and then the recovery team members should restore compromised
system. It must be secured to prevent other intrusions.
System administrators should report all intrusions to an authority, which may be
the manager of the company or CERT. Intrusion investigation and recovery team
members need to know who specifically will perform which procedures, what reports
will be generated, and who will review the findings in these reports. Investigation
process and recovery process team members require,
• a search tool that can use both character sets in its searches. Preferably, a single pass
through the media will search using both character sets simultaneously.
• an ability to generate a listing of all the date/time stamps an operating system may
store in relation to each file in the file system. This means that; some operating
systems store various dates and times in relation to the files in the file system. Those
dates/times may include Date/Time Last Modified, Date/Time Last Accessed, or
Date/Time Created. Not all operating systems record all those date/time
combinations. But if an operating system records any date/time stamp data in
relation to files in a file system, the tool must list all date/time data available.
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• an ability to identify and generate a listing of all deleted files in the file system. This
means that; various operating systems handle deleting files in various ways, so the
specific capability of a tool will be dependant on the file system the tool is
examining, but to some degree, all file systems have a way of at least identifying
that a file once existed in a certain space.
• an ability to search the contents of the regular files in a file system without changing
either the data in the file or any date/time data recorded by the operating system
about the file.
• an ability to identify and process special files. This means that; special files are in a
format where their contents are either not written to disk or not maintained
internally in a readily readable, searchable format. These files include compressed
or password protected files; graphics files, video files and audio files; .PDF format
files; files housing email archives and/or active email content.
• the capability to make forensically sound images of a wide variety of media. This
means that; once the preview process has identified that certain systems or media
contain information relevant to the issues at hand, an investigator must have tools
capable of making forensically sound images of those systems or media. The criteria
for "forensically sound" media images is fairly straightforward: the image must
include a true, validated copy of every bit of every byte contained on the media,
without regard to media contents, from the absolute beginning of the media to the
end of the physical device.
• the capability to recover pertinent deleted files or portions. This means that;
logically include a capability to identify and search
• all file slack,
• all free (unallocated) space,
• relevant file headers in free space,
• deleted directories in free space.
• the capability to thoroughly document their activities and succinctly document the
data recovered from a piece of media that are relevant to the under investigation.
This means that; preferably be an automated part of the forensic analysis software.
If the software is self-documenting and certain reports are automatically generated
for the user, based on the results of exercising the capabilities of the software, this
could help make reporting results much simpler.
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• an ability to identify physical space, hardware, software, communications, personnel
support, supplies, and the prioritization of the applications to specify the order of
restoration. Based upon these requirements, appropriate backup procedures and
guidelines must be used.
• an ability to use backup/recovery procedures. This means that; when an object has
been modified and to copy the new object to an alternate location The new location
may be a file system or a database.
In this thesis the requirements of investigation and recovery processes are
represented as a policies, guidelines, procedures and tools in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
In order to express the similarities and differences between guidelines comparison have
been made.
 
Still a lot of work exist to be done in order to define the requirements for
investigation and recovery processes. For these processes data requirements, detail
level of information are different. Future work could therefore concentrate on providing
an estimation of data requirement level for each process. According to these new data
types, new guidelines and procedures could be developed. It is suggested that
investigation and recovery procedures should be performed through standard operating
procedures (SOP). Another future work could include development of additional
guidelines accomplishing complex SOPs. But, it is difficult to develop and difficult to
apply. that cover every aspect of investigation and recoveries because intrusions vary in
a wide spectrum due to their nature. And finally, a software which shows the guidelines
and procedures applicable to intrusions can be developed and this software should be
used by ISSO.
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